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Introduction
We could be in the midst of the biggest 
change to the way multinational companies 
are taxed in decades. For the past year, 
over 130 developed and developing 
countries have been trying to agree on how 
to ‘go beyond’ some of the fundamental 
principles that have underpinned cooperation 
on corporate taxation for a century (OECD 
2019a). In January 2019, they opened 
negotiations to redistribute ‘taxing rights’ over 
multinational businesses among themselves, 
a matter previously thought too complex to 
discuss in a multilateral setting. Their reason 
for doing so was the challenge of taxing 
digitalised business models effectively.
What makes these proposals potentially 
radical is not just that they transgress 
decades-old taxation norms. It’s also that 
they are being developed within an ‘Inclusive 
Framework’ (IF) in which many developing 
countries have a seat at the table. This is an 
institutional innovation by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), a cartel of 36 more developed 
countries that has historically been the 
de facto global standard-setter. 
The IF proposals divide opinion. The 
Financial Times described them as ‘a global 
shake-up of corporate taxation’, while 
according to the International Tax Review, 
‘the OECD has stunned the tax world by 
signalling countries’ willingness to consider 
radical steps to drag the global corporate 
tax system into the 21st century’ (Giles 
2019; Hartley 2019). In contrast, Joseph 
Stiglitz accused the OECD of ‘canonizing 
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gradualism’, while civil society groups such as 
Tax Justice Network Africa and ActionAid believe 
that the proposals ‘will not adequately address 
underlying global issues surrounding tax evasion 
and IFFs [illicit financial flows]’ (Stiglitz 2019; Tax 
Justice Network Africa and ActionAid Denmark 
2019). The BEPS Monitoring Group considers 
them ‘unnecessarily complex’ and has called 
for a more comprehensive approach (BEPS 
Monitoring Group 2019).
At the time of writing, the OECD is struggling to 
hold together a coalition that includes powerful 
emerging markets such as India, impatient 
European countries such as France, and an 
increasingly belligerent United States. The 
challenge of brokering an agreement among 
these powerful states is one reason to lower 
expectations about what the evolving proposals 
can deliver for developing countries, even though 
many of them are at the table. Participation in 
whatever agreement emerges will entail real 
costs and risks, which must be evaluated against 
what appear limited potential gains. But there is 
also much to play for, in this process itself and in 
the precedents it sets. This paper describes the 
proposals as they stand, and highlights some of 
the issues for developing countries. It draws on 
discussions with developing country negotiators 
and other participants in the IF discussions 
between July 2019 and January 2020, as well as 
their published comments.
Developing country 
interests in international 
tax cooperation
What are we reforming when we say, 
‘international tax reform’? Until recently the 
nature of international tax rules could be 
explained concisely: first, that soft law was 
developed by the OECD, and often adapted 
with developing countries in mind by a United 
Nations (UN) expert committee; second, that 
soft law became hard law through bilateral 
treaties based on the OECD and UN templates, 
or when countries based their domestic law 
on it. Today the institutional picture is more 
complicated: the OECD/UN division of labour 
has been disrupted by the creation of the IF 
and the emergence of regional model treaties 
in Africa; multilateral agreements are taking on 
an increasingly ‘harder’ character, for example 
through the minimum standards that IF members 
are expected to meet.
Developing countries face two difficulties with 
existing rules, both of which are hardwired 
in. First, the restrictions they impose on the 
ability to tax foreign multinationals at ‘source’ 
are too great. The premise of the system is 
that recipients of foreign investment should 
accept numerous restrictions on their ability 
to tax that investment. Second, they are too 
complex to administer effectively. ICTD research 
has considered at length the ways in which 
international tax rules could be simplified to 
reflect the reality of resource constraints in 
lower-income countries (Durst 2019; Ezenagu 
2019; Picciotto 2018). 
In spite of these problems, there is some 
flexibility in the system for lower-income 
countries. The terms of individual bilateral 
treaties, for example, can vary, although rarely 
beyond the parameters set by the model 
treaties. Research has shown that, although 
they have that room to manoeuvre, lower-
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income countries have not generally managed 
to take full advantage of the possibility for 
greater ‘taxing rights’ provided for them by 
the UN model treaty (Hearson 2016; Mutava 
2019). Perhaps more importantly, adherence 
to international tax rules is not mandatory. 
Countries aren’t given taxing rights by the 
OECD or the UN. They choose to surrender 
them when they sign binding tax treaties, or 
when they follow soft law such as the OECD’s 
transfer pricing guidelines. For countries that 
have not historically been international tax 
rule-makers, there is therefore a trade-off 
between the benefits of adhering to international 
consensus and the more parochial gains from 
unilateralism.
We are now seven years out from the first 
discussions about what is becoming known 
as ‘BEPS 1’. This original ‘Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting’ project was led by the OECD and 
G20 and focused on their priorities. With a few 
small exceptions, it neither reallocated taxing 
rights nor simplified existing rules (Oguttu 2017, 
2016; Valderrama 2018). As a result, uptake 
from developing countries was muted. In Africa, 
for example, only 25 out of 54 countries have 
joined the IF, the Institutional Framework that 
emerged from BEPS 1. Only 13 have signed the 
Multilateral Instrument, the hard law instrument 
that accompanies it. Some of these have 
participated due to coercion by the European 
Union, rather than out of genuine enthusiasm 
(ATAF 2019a: 20).
These, then, are two initial questions we can 
ask when testing how beneficial any new 
reforms are from the perspective of lower-
income countries: (1) do they make corporate 
tax easier to administer? and (2) do they 
give (proportionately) more taxing rights to 
developing countries? Two further questions will 
be addressed later in the paper.
Developing country 
interests in taxing the 
digitalising economy
On top of these historical issues, developing 
countries are considering how to respond 
to the opportunities and challenges created 
by digitalisation, just like other countries. 
Digitalised business models are having 
transformative effects in areas of economic life 
where developing countries had lagged behind, 
effectively leap-frogging analogue stages. 
For example, the widespread use of mobile 
banking has overcome the absence of retail 
banking penetration. Social media has taken 
off in an environment with less intense offline 
communication.
In most cases, developing countries are moving 
slower than developed countries in formulating 
policy responses, but we can observe some 
innovation here (Rukundo 2020). In corporate tax, 
for example, Kenya recently proposed to expand 
its definition of permanent establishment to include 
digital advertising platforms. African countries 
such as Uganda, Kenya and South Africa have 
revised their value added tax laws to cover 
imports, especially by digital means, including 
requirements for platforms or payment agents to 
help with enforcement. A number of countries have 
also introduced or are considering more specific 
taxes targeted at various kinds of payments for 
digitalised services or transactions. However, 
these fall on consumers and can be unpopular.
The current process, informally known as ‘BEPS 
2.0’, emerged as a result of similar unilateral 
measures among OECD and G20 states, in 
particular the introduction of digital service taxes 
in Europe and Asia. It has three main drivers: 
to reallocate some tax base to these ‘market 
countries’ in which highly digitalised multinational 
companies make money, regardless of whether 
they have a physical presence; to prevent 
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unilateral actions and disputes arising from them; 
to internationalise some of the anti-tax avoidance 
measures introduced by the US government in 
its recent tax reform.
This leads to a third question against which to 
evaluate the proposed reforms: (3) how much 
overlap is there between measures designed to 
satisfy these priorities, and the (admittedly not 
yet clearly formulated) priorities of developing 
countries in this area?
Structural issues with 
developing country 
participation
In response to criticism of interim proposals, 
the OECD secretariat has leaned heavily on 
the inclusiveness of the IF, the 137-strong body 
through which the reform process is being 
conducted. ‘We now serve all these countries and 
a compromise will have to be found among all of 
them’, the Director of its Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration has said (cited in Topham 2019). 
The reality of any consensus-based decision-
making process, however, is that not all countries 
are able to make use of their membership to 
the same extent. There are several reasons for 
this, as discussed in a 2019 report by ATAF, the 
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF 2019a). 
Four stand out from this report and ICTD’s own 
initial research. First, developing countries are 
at the early stages of policy development – not 
just on tax and digitalisation, but on digital 
strategies for their economies. The issue-framing 
stage of the BEPS 2.0 process took place at 
a point where these countries had not clearly 
identified their concerns and is likely to reach 
critical decision points before they are fully ready. 
Second, the process is operating at a pace that 
is demanding for many OECD members, but 
impossible for many lower-income countries to 
participate in fully. As ATAF commented after 
the most recent IF plenary meeting, “we are 
very concerned that the political and technical 
complexities of the Inclusive Framework 
proposals and the timing of the process that 
aims for a global agreement by the end of 2020 
means it is extremely challenging for many 
of our members to fully participate...some 
countries may commit to new rules without a full 
understanding of the revenue and investment 
implications for them” (ATAF 2020).
Third, lower-income countries are not well 
organised into caucuses, unlike the OECD, 
G7 and European Union, which all have a 
long tradition of working together to negotiate 
common positions. While ATAF and the 
Intergovernmental Group of 24 (G-24) have 
emerged as developing country blocs within the 
IF, it will take time and experience to build up 
a culture of effective caucusing. Fourth, lower-
income countries often suffer from a disjuncture 
between technicians and their political 
counterparts. While developed countries are 
represented in the IF by senior finance ministry 
officials or others with a policy mandate, lower-
income countries are generally represented by 
revenue authority officials. ATAF (2019a: 16) 
expresses concern that ‘the pace of change of 
international tax standards presents a major 
challenge to many African countries, particularly 
as much of the BEPS outcomes requires more 
than operational decisions; they also require 
policy changes that must be channelled through 
Ministries of Finance’.
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It is extremely challenging 
for many of our members to 
fully participate.  
– African Tax 
Administration Forum
The OECD secretariat is committed to helping 
developing country participants overcome these 
constraints, but it is also important to be realistic. 
It is unlikely that a process moving so quickly, 
with contours determined by big power politics, 
will produce an outcome over which lower-
income countries feel ownership. According 
to one developing country negotiator, ‘We are 
waiting for someone to tell us: “Here is your part 
of the leftovers”.’ On the other hand, African 
officials state that they are in discussions about 
implementing unilateral measures based on a 
pessimistic reading of the OECD process.
This brings us to a fourth and final question 
with which to evaluate the proposals: (4) will 
the institutional framework that emerges from 
BEPS 2.0 allow developing countries to continue 
to formulate solutions suited to their own 
circumstances in the medium term?
The current proposals: 
‘Pillar One’
The IF’s work on BEPS 2.0 is divided into two 
pillars. The explicit purpose of Pillar One is to 
reallocate a share of multinational companies’ 
taxable profits towards the ‘market’ countries 
in which they make sales. In January 2019, the 
IF published a document summarising three 
proposals to do this (OECD 2019a). Although 
they were not attributed to countries, the 
proposals were widely acknowledged to have 
originated with the US (‘marketing intangibles’), 
the UK (‘user participation’) and the G-24 
(‘significant economic presence’). 
In October 2019 these proposals were 
superseded by the secretariat’s proposal for 
a unified approach, as the basis for finding a 
consensus among all parties (OECD 2019b). The 
developing country negotiators spoken with by the 
author since its publication have largely described 
the secretariat proposal as closer to that of the 
US, with little connection to the G-24’s significant 
economic presence. As the UN Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters (UN Tax Committee 2019: 2) states, 
‘elements in the significant economic presence 
proposal, which could be important for developing 
countries, are not included in the currently 
proposed Unified Approach’.
The secretariat proposal includes three ‘amounts’:
• ‘Amount A’ has had the highest profile 
because it abandons certain red lines that 
have until now defined the parameters of 
what was possible in international tax reform. 
It would establish a ‘new taxing right’ under 
which companies would become taxable on 
their net profits in a country in whose economic 
life they have a critical mass of sales and 
possibly users. This would be the case even 
where they have no physical presence, which 
current rules require. Furthermore, it would 
allocate a portion of profits to countries where 
the new taxing right exists by means of a 
formula, which until recently was anathema 
to the OECD. Despite this excitement, there 
is a low expectation among participants in the 
IF negotiations that Amount A would deliver 
significant new tax revenue for lower-income 
countries. The United States also appeared 
to withdraw support from this proposal in 
December 2019 (Mnuchin 2019).
• ‘Amount B’ would attribute profits to 
companies’ marketing and distribution 
functions, with the proposal that ‘the possibility 
of using fixed remunerations would be 
explored’ (OECD 2019b: 9). This would only 
apply where there is a physical presence, and 
would be largely a simplification of existing 
rules. Depending on the formulae agreed it 
could attribute some additional profits towards 
the market country, but these are most likely 
profits that that country currently misses out 
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on due to the challenges of enforcing existing 
rules; it does not represent a change in the 
political settlement underlying those rules. 
Nonetheless, it is widely considered that 
Amount B is the principal part of the proposal 
from which lower-income countries could be 
expected to gain. They often complain that 
multinationals manipulate the profits of their 
distribution companies downwards as a tax 
planning technique, and that existing tax 
rules do not adequately capture the value 
creation of localised marketing functions. 
In the longer term, the endorsement of a 
simplified approach here – something that 
ICTD research has pointed towards – would 
set a precedent that could be as significant as 
the abandonment of physical presence and the 
use of a formula (Ezenagu 2019).
• ‘Amount C’ would allow a country to challenge 
the amount received via amounts A and B, 
adjusting the total upwards using traditional 
transfer pricing methods if it considered that 
appropriate.
Importantly, this proposal is designed to be 
overlaid on top of the existing bilateral treaty 
regime, not replace it. The claim that it would 
nonetheless enhance certainty within the 
international tax regime comes from its use of 
simplifications, as well as from the secretariat’s 
proposal that: ‘Any dispute between the market 
jurisdiction and the taxpayer over any element of 
the proposal should be subject to legally binding 
and effective dispute prevention and resolution 
mechanisms’ (OECD 2019b: 9).
There are three overriding issues for lower-
income countries with the Pillar One proposal as it 
stands: scope, allocation and dispute resolution.
Issue 1: scope
Amount A of Pillar One would cover all 
consumer-facing businesses, not just the 
highly digitalised companies whose tax affairs 
triggered discussions. Similarly, Amount B 
would apply to companies’ marketing and 
distribution activities. The difficulty of arriving at 
clear definitions of these concepts is a common 
theme in many comments received by the 
OECD. The scope of Amount A in particular 
would be likely to be limited in several ways 
that would significantly affect its relevance to 
developing countries.
• Identifying the companies within scope. 
Amount A would only apply to companies 
with a turnover greater than a certain 
amount, possibly €750m. Only the world’s 
largest companies would be affected. For 
example, Jumia, perhaps Africa’s best-known 
e-commerce firm, turned over just €130m 
last year (Reuters 2019). The G-24 proposed 
a lower threshold of €500m, while the UN 
tax committee suggested a lower threshold 
for regional businesses (Intergovernmental 
Group of 24 2019; UN Tax Committee 2019). 
There would also be ‘carve-outs’ excluding 
certain sectors. The proposal states that 
the new approach is not suitable for ‘the 
extractive industries’. It also suggests other 
possible exclusions, such as commodities 
and financial services. What does this mean 
for developing countries? They could benefit 
from the exclusion of sectors where their 
position is primarily near the beginning of 
value chains, and where they do not have 
large consumer markets. Other sectoral 
carve-outs, such as for financial services or 
shipping, could limit their gains from the ‘new 
taxing right’.
• Identifying the countries in which they are 
taxable. The new taxing right for Amount A 
would only kick in once sales and/or users 
exceed a certain amount. This could work 
against less wealthy countries, where sales 
are naturally lower in absolute terms. The 
secretariat’s proposal helpfully leaves open the 
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possibility of adapting this threshold to market 
size, a point made by all the submissions from 
developing country groups. It also suggested 
somehow including non-paying users, an 
important point given the popularity in Africa 
of services such as WhatsApp, which collect 
user data, but do not sell services to users or 
advertisers.
• Identifying the profits to be redistributed. 
Amount A would only apply to a company’s 
‘residual’ profits, which the proposal suggests 
cannot be easily tied to particular parts of the 
business and are particularly high for digital 
companies. The residual profit would be any 
profit above a fixed percentage deemed to 
be the ‘routine’ profit rate, which would be 
negotiated within the IF. Once determined, 
the residual profits would again be subdivided 
by applying a fixed percentage, this time 
into those associated with the market (this 
is ‘Amount A’), and those associated with 
other functions. Clearly, the amount of profits 
redistributed under Amount A would depend on 
these two fixed percentages. Equally clearly, 
agreeing them among over 130 countries is 
likely to be a key sticking point. It has been 
made clear that setting the rates will be a 
political decision. 
In summary, the gains for lower-income countries 
from Amount A would be limited to companies’ 
‘consumer-facing’ business higher than a certain 
overall threshold, with sales in the market above 
a certain threshold, excluding certain sectors, 
and only a proportion of their profits. Those 
elements are still under negotiation. 
Issue 2: allocation
Once the scope of the profits covered by 
the new taxing right is determined, the next 
question is where they would be allocated. Pillar 
One is premised on the motivation of moving 
the tax base towards the market country. 
Amount A would thus allocate the profits in 
scope using a formula that incorporates sales 
as the basis of allocation. As noted above, 
including non-paying users in the calculation 
may be to the benefit of lower-income countries. 
Campaigners and commentators have seized 
on analysis from the IMF and elsewhere 
suggesting that a reallocation based on sales 
may not benefit lower-income countries, and 
argued that labour (staff costs and/or numbers) 
should be included as well (De Mooij, R.A., Liu, 
L., and Prihardini 2019, Cobham, Faccio and 
FitzGerald 2019).
Under Amount B, meanwhile, the level of any 
fixed rate of return on marketing and distribution 
activities would be important to the gains for 
lower-income countries. If it varied by sector, 
the value of the return in sectors of relevance to 
developing countries would be a critical matter 
for negotiation. 
Issue 3: dispute resolution
Dispute resolution is already a subject of some 
controversy between developed and developing 
countries. Most lower-income countries have 
little experience of the Mutual Agreement 
Procedure, which is the non-binding form of 
dispute resolution in their bilateral tax treaties. 
Furthermore, the current form of binding dispute 
settlement – tax treaty arbitration – is eschewed 
not just by lower-income countries but also by 
larger emerging markets such as India and 
China. ATAF, the UN tax committee and the G-24 
all state opposition to mandatory binding arbitration, 
and what the G-24 describes as ‘the linkage of 
the solution to the dispute resolution measures’ 
(Intergovernmental Group of 24 2019: 1). By 
January 2020 this had become ATAF’s “primary 
concern” with Pillar One (ATAF 2020). Finding a 
form of dispute settlement that is acceptable to 
developing countries is likely to be challenging, 
but it is also a non-negotiable element of the 
proposals for the United States.
Corporate Tax Negotiations at the OECD:
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The current proposals: 
‘Pillar Two’
The second pillar of the IF agenda, referred to as 
the Global Anti-Base Erosion proposal, ‘GloBE’ 
(OECD 2019c) is not really about the digitalised 
economy at all. It aims to ensure a minimum 
global effective tax rate for multinational 
companies. It proposes four rules that would 
make it much harder for them to move taxable 
profits around in order to minimise their tax 
liabilities. These rules would allow countries 
to impose tax on multinational companies’ 
income that would otherwise be taxed below a 
minimum effective tax rate. Some of them would 
be applied by the host countries in which a 
multinational company operates, and others in its 
home country.
• Under the undertaxed payments rule, the 
host country would identify payments within a 
multinational firm that reduce its local taxable 
profits and are not subject to a minimum 
rate of tax. Tax could be imposed through a 
withholding tax, already a commonplace tool 
in developing countries, or by including the 
payments in calculating the local company’s 
taxable profits.
• The subject to tax rule would apply a similar 
principle to tax treaties. It would disallow 
reductions in the tax that a company pays in 
the host country because of its tax treaties, 
where the payment affected by the tax treaty is 
not subject to a minimum tax rate. 
• The income inclusion rule is the corollary 
to the undertaxed payments rule, but would 
focus on multinational companies’ branches 
and affiliates, rather than on payments 
between them. It would allow the home 
country to tax the income of the foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of a parent 
company if they do not pay the minimum 
effective rate. This rule would partially reverse 
the direction of travel in developed countries’ 
tax systems, from ‘worldwide’ systems that 
taxed multinationals’ foreign profits minus a 
credit for taxes already paid abroad, towards 
‘territorial’ systems that exempt profits earned 
abroad from tax at home.
• The switchover rule is an accompanying 
tool to be included in the home country’s tax 
treaties. It would allow it to tax the profits made 
by an overseas branch or from immovable 
property (e.g. land) on a worldwide basis, 
rather than through an exemption as the treaty 
might otherwise specify.
Pillar Two has attracted less attention, because 
the overall shape is less controversial.4 In part, 
this is because it is inspired by reforms already 
adopted in the US, which other countries are 
seeking to emulate. Nonetheless, Pillar Two 
is potentially worth more than Pillar One in 
revenue terms, which means there is more at 
stake from design decisions. There are many 
unresolved questions about how each rule would 
be designed and how they would interact. Three 
design elements would be particularly important 
in determining how much developing countries 
would gain from Pillar Two: rate, rule order and 
tax incentives.
4 For example, the G-24 and the UN tax committee submitted comments to the OECD’s October 2019 consultation on Pillar One, 
but not its November 2019 consultation on Pillar Two.
Pillar Two is potentially 
worth more than Pillar One 
in revenue terms, which 
means there is more at 
stake from design 
decisions.
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Issue 4: rate
The IF plans to specify agreed minimum 
effective rates, rather than leaving this decision 
to individual countries, as international tax 
negotiations usually do. Countries have 
different preferences for the minimum rate, 
determined by a number of elements. One of 
these is how strong they want these rules to 
be: whether they want them to deter only the 
most aggressive forms of tax avoidance that 
achieve very low rates, or whether they want to 
establish a relatively high floor on the effective 
tax rates paid by multinational firms. Another 
element is their own corporate tax rates: since 
developing countries tend to have higher rates 
than developed countries, a lower minimum 
rate “is unlikely to lead to a change in taxpayer 
behaviour.” 
Issue 5: rule order
Because more than one of Pillar Two’s four 
rules could apply in many cases, countries 
would need to agree on which rule prevails 
when they clash. The list of the four proposed 
rules above began with those most likely to 
give taxing rights to developing countries. 
Documents published by the OECD tend to 
begin with the income inclusion rule, and OECD 
member states want this to have priority. 
Nonetheless, it has been the subject of much 
disagreement within the IF steering group. 
ATAF argues that the undertaxed payments 
and subject to tax rules should be applied 
first, to ‘help address the current imbalance in 
allocating taxing rights between residence and 
source jurisdictions’ (ATAF 2019b). It has been 
suggested that the rule order would matter 
little when their function is to change behaviour 
and deter tax avoidance, not to raise revenue 
directly. It is hard to square this argument with 
strongly-held country positions on both sides 
of the debate. 
Issue 6: tax incentives
The OECD’s consultation document states that 
the GloBE proposal could reduce tax 
competition between states, not only in terms 
of the ‘harmful’ tax competition that enables 
tax avoidance, but also competition through 
lower rates and tax incentives. It points out 
that ‘the GloBE proposal may shield 
developing countries from pressure to offer 
inefficient tax incentives’ (OECD 2019c: 7). This 
is a very positive development in terms of tax 
policy, but makes the politics trickier, because 
it is an incursion on ‘policy space’. Tax 
incentives are widely used by African states, 
and many tax treaties have special ‘tax 
sparing’ clauses that prevent a multinational’s 
home country from imposing extra taxes where 
the taxes were reduced as a result of tax 
incentives in the treaty partner. As African 
officials have explained, it would be difficult to 
sell the GloBE package to a finance minister if 
part of its effect would be to reduce his/her 
ability to use tax incentives for investment 
promotion. That said, if OECD and G20 
countries move ahead with adopting the 
income inclusion rule, developing countries 
may have no choice in the matter. Two design 
choices could achieve a compromise. The first 
is an income inclusion rule that would allow 
firms to blend their profits, either at the 
jurisdiction level so that low taxes from an 
incentive would be offset by taxes paid in other 
parts of the business, or globally whereby 
companies could offset low tax in one country 
with high tax in another. ATAF, in its comments 
on the GloBE proposal, does not support 
blending beyond jurisdiction level. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that 
income benefitting from tax incentives that are 
widely accepted as ‘not harmful’ could be 
carved out of the Pillar Two regime.
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Conclusion: costs and 
benefits for developing 
countries: what we 
know so far
Each of the issues listed above is currently at 
least partly unresolved. The overall cost/benefit 
calculation is therefore very unclear at present. 
If we return to the four questions posed earlier, 
however, we can reach several initial conclusions.
1. Do the proposals make corporate 
tax easier to administer?
Amounts A and B of Pillar One are explicitly 
designed to simplify, by introducing formulary 
and mechanical approaches. Both would be 
limited in scope in the current negotiation round, 
but the precedent for further expansion of these 
simplified approaches may be significant. Pillar 
Two would be designed to change behaviour, 
reducing tax avoidance, taking some pressure 
off revenue authorities’ enforcement efforts. 
Both the G-24 and UN tax committee urge the 
IF to consider a simplified application using 
withholding taxes, which have long been a simple 
frontline tool against tax avoidance in developing 
countries. All that said, the proposed new rules 
would be applied on top of existing ones, so 
there would be a significant implementation 
burden in terms of putting in place the right 
legal arrangements and training staff. The UN 
tax committee has stated that it is ‘concerned 
about the complexity of the proposal’ (UN Tax 
Committee 2019: 4). Strengthened dispute 
settlement would further intensify these demands 
on participating states. This burden needs to be 
considered against any potential gains.
The proposals under both pillars rely on revenue 
authorities having financial information about 
multinational companies to which current 
international agreements do not automatically 
give them access. This is especially so for 
developing countries, which in most cases 
only have access to information about a 
multinational’s local operations in their country. 
For example, for Pillar One, they would need 
to know the full picture of a company’s global 
operations in order to claim an apportionment 
of residual profits. The first BEPS process 
introduced a country-by-country reporting 
requirement for multinational companies, but 
the reports are submitted to multinationals’ 
home countries. Other countries can only obtain 
them by joining the exchange of information 
system, unless they introduce a requirement 
for local filing as Vietnam has done. For Pillar 
Two, governments would need information on 
foreign companies receiving payments from their 
country, which currently requires a resource-
consuming exchange of information on request. 
2. Do the proposals give a greater 
share of taxing rights to developing 
countries?
This is less clear. Any redistribution would be 
a political decision, the result of a negotiated 
outcome. Pillar One is explicitly designed 
to redistribute to ‘market jurisdictions’, but 
developing countries are not always in this 
category for every sector. For extractive industries 
and many commodities they are net producers, 
while in other sectors their market size is small if 
measured purely on the basis of sales. It is widely 
understood that the gains for developing countries 
from Pillar One would come from Amount B, 
which is a simplification of existing rules and does 
not represent a policy decision to redistribute 
between onshore jurisdictions, but rather revenue 
Any redistribution 
[of taxing rights] will be 
a political decision, the 
result of a negotiated 
outcome.
www.ictd.ac 11
Corporate Tax Negotiations at the OECD:
What’s at Stake for Developing Countries in 2020?
gains resulting from easier implementation of 
existing rules. Any distributive impact of Pillar Two 
beyond its anti-avoidance element would depend 
on the rule order agreed. In all cases, however, 
estimating the revenue gains for developing 
countries is more challenging than for developed 
countries because of data limitations, as well as 
the analytical capabilities of revenue authorities 
and finance ministries.
3. Do the proposals adapt sufficiently 
to the challenges of digitalisation?
The proposed reforms would update international 
tax rules taking into account some of the 
major challenges presented by the digital 
economy: the ability to make profit in a country 
without a physical presence, the role of data in 
business models, and the ability to shift profits 
by manipulating intellectual property. These 
would inevitably be partial steps, since debates 
about rates, rule order and thresholds would 
all produce compromises that limit the gains to 
developing countries, as is the nature of any 
negotiation process. Furthermore, digitalised 
business models in developed and developing 
countries do not always look the same, as the 
popularity of mobile money in Africa illustrates.
Further adaptations of international tax rules to 
technological change will inevitably be needed 
in the medium term. As artificial intelligence 
expands throughout the value chain, the 
emphasis on sales without physical presence in 
the BEPS 2.0 process will become outmoded. 
Increasingly, the challenge for developing 
countries will be in commodity production and 
manufacturing processes, where value-added 
will be hollowed out, and with it the tax base.
4. Will the institutional framework 
provide space for medium-term 
innovation?
The key driver of this process, as made clear 
by OECD documents, is to halt the spread of 
unilateral taxes on digital services, particularly 
the DSTs implemented or proposed across 
Europe. The final form of the package deal will 
not be clear for some time, but according to 
OECD officials it is likely to include a moratorium 
on such unilateral measures. Any moratorium 
could be enforced through a minimum standard 
within the IF; it might also filter through to any 
binding dispute mechanism. This would be a real 
cost/benefit dilemma for developing countries, 
many of which continue to debate the merits of 
joining the IF and Multilateral Instrument.
The outstanding question for developing 
countries considering the costs and benefits 
of adopting the IF consensus will be: is it 
preferable to adopt the consensus approach 
or to design a home-grown solution, if it is 
not possible to do both at once? Unilateral 
measures are undoubtedly second best: they 
may be levied on gross income rather than net, 
which has more distorting effects; they are more 
likely to create double taxation; when indirect 
taxes on digital services are used, they can be 
more regressive, and can have negative impacts 
on freedom of speech and financial inclusion. 
The most sustainable outcome will therefore be 
one that provides a framework for innovation in 
areas opened up by the OECD discussions, to 
help minimise these negative consequences. 
We must recognise that developing countries 
are at an inevitable structural disadvantage 
in global negotiations. They also need time 
to understand the impact on their economies 
and tax bases, and hence their needs from 
international tax reform.
The most sustainable 
outcome will … be one 
that provides a framework 
for innovation.
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